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Green IPO Jinko Solar Analysis – Extremely Low Quality Offering Seems to be Done in Desperation

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Jinko Solar  managed to list today at the bottom end of the range at $11.Earlier they had to cancel their  plan to list in February due to weak market conditions.Well it seems they had to  IPO otherwise the founders and owners would have been left nothing from this excerpt taken from their F1 filing with the SEC

Our founders may be obligated to transfer up to 41.3% of our issued and outstanding share capital to holders of our series B redeemable convertible preferred shares for no further consideration, which may result in our founders losing control of our company.

In connection with the investment by the holders of series B redeemable convertible preferred shares in us, our founders executed and delivered a commitment letter to the holders of our series B redeemable convertible preferred shares on December 16, 2008, which was subsequently amended on June 22, 2009. Pursuant to the June 2009 Modification, we will deliver to the holders of series B redeemable convertible preferred shares our audited financial statements for 2010 by April 30, 2011. If by the time we deliver our audited financial statements for 2010, the Qualified IPO has not been completed and our net income after certain adjustments is less than the target amount for 2010, our founders will be obligated to transfer to the holders of series B redeemable convertible preferred shares for no further consideration an aggregate of up to 26,273,540 ordinary shares, representing 41.3% of our issued and outstanding share capital immediately before this offering, which may result in our founders losing control of our company.

Even fundamentally the company looks very weak

  1. Lack of Manufacturing Experience – They were a trading company till 2009 when they got into the manufacturing business.After they built a wafer plant they went into making cells and modules by acquisitions.From the filing

    We commenced producing solar cells in July 2009 following our acquisition of Zhejiang Jinko, which has manufactured solar cells since June 2007. In addition, we commenced producing solar modules in August 2009. We made our first commercial shipments of monocrystalline ingots and wafers in August 2007 and March 2008, respectively, and our first commercial shipments of multicrystalline wafers and solar cells in July 2008 and 2009, respectively. We made our first commercial shipment of solar modules in August 2009

  2. Suppliers at Risk as “Going Concern” –  They made advance payments to new players like Hoku which themselves are at risk as a going concern.From the filing

    We have entered into a long-term supply contract with Hoku, a virgin polysilicon supplier, pursuant to which we had made a total prepayment of US$20.0 million to Hoku as of July 8, 2009. Hoku is currently in the process of undertaking a construction project for producing the virgin polysilicon we have contracted for. While our prepayment is secured by a lien on Hoku’s assets according to the terms of our supply contract with Hoku, such lien is deeply subordinated and shared with all other customers and other senior lenders of Hoku. On December 23, 2009, Hoku publicly announced that on December 22, 2009, it issued shares and warrants representing a majority of its shares to Tianwei New Energy Holdings Co., Ltd., or Tianwei, a PRC company engaged in the manufacturing of silicon wafers, solar cells and modules. In addition, pursuant to the arrangement between Hoku and Tianwei, Tianwei has the right to appoint a majority of the directors of Hoku Scientific, thus giving Tianwei control of Hoku. In exchange, Tianwei cancelled US$50 million of indebtedness that Hoku would be obligated to repay to Tianwei under certain polysilicon supply agreements and Tianwei agreed to provide Hoku with a loan of US$50 million through China Construction Bank in two tranches within 60 days after December 22, 2009. As disclosed in Hoku’s Form 10-Q filed on February 5, 2010, Hoku would have sufficient financing to pay its current liabilities and complete construction of its virgin polysilicon production plant to the point where it could commence initial shipment of virgin polysilicon to its customers if Hoku receives the US$50 million loan from Tianwei and US$55 million of additional prepayments from its existing customers. As of March 8, 2010, Hoku had received the US$50 million loan from Tianwei. If Hoku does not receive anticipated prepayments under its polysilicon supply agreements, it may need to curtail the construction of its virgin polysilicon plant. In addition, Hoku will still need to seek additional financing to complete its virgin polysilicon construction project. If Hoku is unable to obtain the required financing, it could raise substantial doubt about Hoku’s ability to continue as a going concern.I

  3. Vertical Inegration in Name Only – Their costs are going to be much higher than bigger “true” vertically integrated players like Trina Solar because of transportation costs.From the filing

    Our manufacturing facilities for the production of silicon ingots, wafers and solar modules are, and will continue to be, located in Shangrao, Jiangxi Province while our manufacturing facilities for the production of solar cells are located in Haining, Zhejiang Province. We expect to use an increasingly large portion of our silicon wafer output for our own solar cell production, and as a result, we transport a substantial volume of our silicon wafers from Shangrao to Haining to be processed into solar cells. Our principal manufacturing base for our solar modules is located in Shangrao, and as a result, we need to transport a substantial volume of our solar cells from Haining to Shangrao to be processed into solar modules The geographical separation of our manufacturing facilities necessitates constant long-distance transportation of substantial volumes of our silicon wafers and solar cells between Shangrao and Hainan.

There are many more  qualitative/quantitative weaknesses.Readers can read more about the risks which seem plenty, here in their filing.Readers are invited to share comments about whether my analysis is right or wrong.

PG

Sneha Shah

I am Sneha, the Editor-in-chief for the Blog. We would be glad to receive suggestions, inputs & comments on GWI from you guys to keep it going! You can contact me for consultancy/trade inquires by writing an email to greensneha@yahoo.in

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